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Abstract
This paper studies a queuing model in which a buyer sources a good or service from a single supplier chosen
from a pool of suppliers. The buyer seeks to minimize the sum of her procurement and operating costs, the
latter of which depends on the supplier’s lead time. The selected supplier can regulate his lead time, but faster
lead times are costly. Although the buyer selects the supplier to source from (possibly via an auction) and
dictates the contractual terms, the buyer’s bargaining power is limited by asymmetric information: The buyer
only has an estimate of the suppliers’ costs, while the suppliers know their costs precisely. We identify a
procurement mechanism that minimizes the buyer’s total cost (procurement plus operating). This mechanism
is not simple: It is a numerically derived nonlinear menu of contracts. Therefore, we study several simpler
mechanisms: e.g., one that charges a late fee and one that specifies a fixed lead-time requirement (no menus,
no nonlinear functions). We find that simple mechanisms are nearly optimal (generally within 1% of optimal)
because asymmetric information conveys significant protection to the supplier, i.e., the supplier is able to
retain most of the benefit of having a lower cost. Renegotiation is another concern with the optimal
mechanism: Because it does not minimize the supply chain’s cost, the firms can be both better off if they throw
away the contract and start over. Interestingly, we find that the potential gain from renegotiation is relatively
small with either the optimal or our simple mechanisms. We conclude that our simple mechanisms are quite
attractive along all relevant dimensions: buyer’s performance, supply chain performance, simplicity, and
robustness to renegotiation.
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Abstract
This paper studies, in the context of a queuing model, a buyer that
sources a good or service from an single supplier chosen from a pool of
potential suppliers. The buyer seeks to minimize the sum of her procure-
ment cost and her operating cost, the latter depends on the supplier’s lead
time performance. The selected supplier can regulate his lead time, but
faster lead times are costly. Although the buyer selects the supplier to
source from (possibly via an auction) and dictates the contractual terms,
the buyer’s bargaining power is limited by asymmetric information: the
buyer only has an estimate of the suppliers’ costs while the suppliers know
their costs precisely. We identify procurement mechanisms for the buyer
that minimize the buyer’s total cost (procurement plus operating). These
mechanisms are not simple: they involve a menu of contracts with non-linear
functions that are derived numerically. Therefore, we study several simpler
mechanisms, e.g., mechanisms that charge a late-fee and mechanisms that
specify a fixed lead time requirement (no menus, no non-linear functions).
We show that simple mechanisms can be nearly optimal: the buyer’s cost
is generally within 1% of optimal. Renegotiation is another concern with
the optimal mechanisms: because they do not minimize the supply chain’s
cost, the firms can be both better oﬀ if they throw away the contract and
start over. Interestingly, we find that the potential gain from renegotia-
tion is relatively small with either the optimal or our simple mechanisms.
Nevertheless, we also identify mechanisms that coordinate the supply chain
(i.e., minimize its costs, thereby eliminating the threat of renegotiation).
∗The authors would like to thank Martin Lariviere, William Lovejoy, Serguei Netessine,
Erica Plambeck and Tunay Tunca for their helpful comments as well as the participants
at the The Second MIT Symposium in Operations Research: Procurement and Pricing
Strategies to Improve Supply Chain Performance. An electronic version of this paper
is available from the authors’ webpages. The previous version of this paper was titled
“Procuring fast delivery, part II: sole sourcing with information asymmetry”.
Those mechanisms are complex (due to asymmetric information) and they
do not perform better for the buyer than our simple mechanisms. We con-
clude that our simple mechanisms are quite attractive along all relevant
dimensions: buyer’s performance, supply chain performance, simplicity and
robustness to renegotiation.
Keywords: Mechanism design, reverse auctions, supply chain coordination,
game theory, renegotiation
1 Introduction
In the sourcing of a product or service, a buyer should consider both procurement price and
delivery lead time. The faster a supplier’s delivery lead time, the lower a buyer’s operating
costs (e.g., inventory holding and backorder penalty costs). A supplier’s delivery lead time
depends on the supplier’s capacity, but capacity is costly, and so there is a classic incentive
conflict within the supply chain: the supplier incurs the direct cost of capacity but the
buyer enjoys its benefit. To complicate matters, the buyer often only has an estimate of the
supplier’s capacity cost, while the supplier knows it precisely.
While practitioners and academics surely understand the importance of lead times in the
procurement process (see Burt, 1989; Pike and Johnson 2002; McNealy 2001; Wise and Mor-
rison 2000), and the advent of the Internet has created an explosion of new marketplaces in
the business-to-business arena (Pinker, Seidmann, Vakrat 2003), there has been surprisingly
little research on how a buyer should design her procurement process to achieve minimum
total cost through an eﬀective balance of price and delivery lead time. That is the question
this paper studies. Our main research questions are summarized as follows.
What is an optimal procurement mechanism for the buyer? A mechanism is any process
that takes information the suppliers announce (e.g., their bid, their cost, etc.) and outputs
the buyer’s decisions: which supplier is chosen, what actions the suppliers must take and how
much they are paid. The optimal mechanism minimizes the buyer’s total cost (procurement
plus operating) and it is the benchmark to assess all other mechanisms.
Do simple procurement mechanisms exist that give the buyer near optimal performance?
The optimal mechanisms are complex along several dimensions: they may be hard to eval-
uate, or they may involve non-linear functions or a complex menu of functions. While we
admit that there is no definitive way to measure how much “simpler” one mechanism is over
another, this ambiguity should not cause research to focus exclusively on optimal mecha-
nisms. We believe simple mechanisms are worth studying because they are more likely to be
implemented in practice. Beil and Wein (2003) make a similar observation based on their
discussions with industry practitioners.
To what extent is supply chain eﬃciency reduced by the buyer’s desire to minimize her own
total cost? The literature on supply chain coordination, which generally does not consider
asymmetric information, suggests the buyer oﬀer the supplier a coordinating contract (one
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that induces the supplier to choose the supply chain optimal capacity) and then negotiate
for as large a share of the supply chain’s profit as possible (e.g., Caldenty and Wein 2003).
But implementing a coordinating contract is diﬃcult with asymmetric information: the
coordinating contract parameters may depend on the unknown information, thereby creating
doubt with at least one firm as to what are the proper contract parameters. In addition, it is
well known (see Laﬀont and Matrimort 2002) that ex post eﬃciency (i.e., maximizing supply
chain performance) is at odds with the buyer’s ex ante desire to maximize her own profit.
This creates a renegotiation opportunity: after the optimal mechanism is implemented the
firms have an incentive to scrap it to capture the lost eﬃciency. We wish to determine the
magnitude of this trade-oﬀ in the context of our model.
The next section describes the model and §3 relates our work to the literature. §4
minimizes the supply chain’s total cost. §5 covers procurement strategies with one potential
supplier and §6 covers competitive bidding among multiple potential suppliers. §7 provides
numerical results and §8 details two extensions to the model. The final section discusses
our results.
2 The model
A buyer must acquire a component from one of n ≥ 1 potential suppliers. The buyer uses
this component in the assembly of a product sold to consumers. (In section 8.2 we assume
the buyer is unable to hold component inventory, so in that case it is possible to interpret the
model in terms of a buyer procuring a service rather than a physical product.) Customer
demand arrives at the buyer according to a Poisson process with rate λ.
The suppliers are make-to-order manufacturers. Let µ be a supplier’s production rate,
which we generally refer to as the supplier’s capacity. The supplier’s inter-production times
are exponentially distributed with mean 1/µ and the supplier incurs a capacity cost at rate
bµ (b > 0) to maintain its capacity. A potential supplier’s capacity cost, b, is a realization
of a random variable with finite support, b ∈
£
b, b¯
¤
with 0 < b ≤ b¯. Let F and f be the cdf
and pdf respectively. We normalize the variable production cost to zero. Once the supplier
completes the production of a unit it is immediately delivered to the buyer.
The buyer incurs inventory holding costs at rate h per unit. A constant holding cost
is reasonable if the physical holding cost plus the financial holding cost on the variable
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production cost dominates the financial holding cost due to the supplier’s capacity cost and
margin. Alternatively, a constant h can be considered as an approximation for the holding
cost given the possible range of procurement costs. Section 8 extends the model to allow
the holding cost to vary with the procurement cost.
Unsatisfied demand is backlogged and the buyer incurs a goodwill cost at rate p per
backorder. The sum of the holding and backorder costs is referred to as the operating costs.
To control her operating costs, the buyer uses a base-stock policy with base-stock level s.
The buyer’s procurement strategy includes two tasks, supplier selection (which supplier
to source from) and contract design (the details of the transfer payment between the buyer
and the supplier). We consider several procurement strategies within two distinct scenarios.
The first scenario is sole sourcing with one potential supplier (n = 1): the buyer only oﬀers
a procurement contract to a single potential supplier, possibly because there is only one
supplier with the necessary technology, or the buyer has a long-run relationship with the
supplier, or because the buyer wishes to develop the component quickly. The next scenario
involves competitive bidding among at least two potential suppliers (n ≥ 2), i.e., the buyer
selects her supplier via some auction mechanism. (These are often called reverse auction
because the suppliers are bidding for the right to sell to the buyer, but we shall just refer to
them as auctions.) Within that scenario there are two versions: with identical suppliers the
suppliers’ have the same capacity cost whereas with heterogenous suppliers each suppliers’
capacity cost is an independent draw from the same distribution. With either version the
buyer knows the distribution from which the suppliers’ capacity costs are drawn, but the
buyer does not observe each supplier’s cost realization. However, the buyer knows whether
the suppliers are identical (have the same cost) or heterogenous (have diﬀerent costs). All
other rules and parameters in the game are common knowledge.
The sequence of events is as follows: the buyer announces her supplier selection process
(some auction mechanism, if n ≥ 2) and her transfer payment contract; assuming the supplier
accepts the contract, the supplier chooses his capacity µ; the buyer observes the supplier’s
lead times and chooses s; the buyer incurs costs (procurement and operating) and the supplier
earns a profit (transfer payment minus capacity costs) over an infinite horizon. The buyer
minimizes the sum of her procurement and operating costs per unit of time. The suppliers
maximize their own expected profit per unit of time. All firms are risk neutral.
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Although we did not design this model with a specific industry in mind, the model is most
representative of the contract manufacturing industry in which firms assemble specialized
components on a make-to-order basis (see Thurm 1998; Bulkeley 2003).
3 Literature review
Our model studies procurement strategies in a queuing framework with asymmetric infor-
mation. There is much related work, the closest of which is Cachon and Zhang (2003)
(CZ). As in this paper, in CZ there is a single buyer with Poisson demand, the suppliers are
make-to-order producers that choose capacity and the buyer is concerned with procurement
and operating costs. However, this paper considers sole-sourcing strategies whereas CZ only
works with multi-sourcing strategies. (For additional work on dual sourcing see Gilbert and
Weng 1998, Ha, Li and Ng 2003, and Kalai, Kamien and Rubinovitch 1992.) Furthermore,
this paper includes asymmetric information, whereas CZ does not.
Caldentey and Wein (2003) study a similar model to ours, but they do not consider
supplier selection from a pool of potential suppliers and they do not have asymmetric in-
formation. They focus on coordination strategies whereas we consider the buyer’s optimal
mechanism. Benjaafar, Elahi and Donohue (2004) study multi-sourcing versus sole-sourcing
strategies for a buyer that has several potential suppliers. They assume the buyer’s price
per unit is fixed and they do not include asymmetric information.
The following papers study a supply chain with two firms and asymmetric information
in non—queuing models: Corbett and de Groote (2000), Corbett (2001), Corbett and Tang
(1998), Corbett, Zhou and Tang (2001) and Ha (2001). As in this paper, those papers
design an optimal menu of contracts, but we also consider a broader set of procurement
strategies (e.g., competitive bidding and coordinating contracts). There is a literature on
quality contracting with asymmetric information (e.g., Baiman, Fischer and Rajan 2000 and
Lim 2001), but those models focus on the buyer’s inspection decisions and the ability to
contract on the outcome of inspections, neither of which is present in our model with lead
times. There is work on supply chain signaling (e.g., Cachon and Lariviere 2001 and Ozer
and Wei 2003). With a signaling model the party that possesses information also designs
the contract whereas in our model the contract designer lacks information.
See Elmaghraby (2000) for a survey of the procurement literature, and see Klemperer
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(1999) and McAfee and McMillan (1987a) for surveys of the auction literature. Most
closely related to our work is McAfee and McMillan (1987b), Laﬀont and Tirole (1987) and
Che (1993). As in our paper, the first two articles study adverse selection (suppliers vary in
their costs) with moral hazard (suppliers exert costly eﬀort that benefits the buyer, where
eﬀort is analogous to capacity). Although there are some diﬀerences, we show that their
results can be used to evaluate the optimal mechanism in our model. However, they do not
study the eﬀectiveness of simple mechanisms nor multiple suppliers with identical capacity
costs. Che (1993) implements the optimal mechanism in McAfee and McMillan (1987b)
and Laﬀont and Tirole (1987) via a scoring-rule auction in which the suppliers bid on both
price and quality.
There are several other papers that study multi-attribute procurement. Chen, Roundy,
Zhang and Janakiraman (2003) study procurement over price and transportation costs, but
take the perspective of a third party auctioneer rather than the buyer. Manelli and Vincent
(1995) consider (in eﬀect) a multi-attribute situation in which the buyer’s value is correlated
with the suppliers’ costs, i.e., the additional attribute is the supplier’s identity. In our model
the buyer is indiﬀerent between any two suppliers as long as the suppliers have the same
delivery time. Beil and Wein (2003) study multi-attribute auctions that occur over multiple
rounds so that the buyer learns information regarding the suppliers in each round. We have
a single round auction, so learning is not possible. They do not consider sole sourcing with
only one potential supplier.
Dasgupta and Spulber (1990), Chen (2001), Hansen (1988), Jin andWu 2002 and Seshadri
and Zemel (2003) study procurement with competitive bidding and variable quantity. In our
model the buyer’s expected purchase quantity is fixed per unit time. There is a literature
on lead time competition through operational strategies (e.g. Li 1992, Cachon and Harker
2002, So 2000), but in those papers the competitive structure is exogenous, whereas in our
model it is endogenous. Ramasesh et al. (1991), Anupindi and Akella (1993), Sedarage
et al. (1999) and Li and Kouvelis (1999) are representative studies investigating a buyer’s
procurement strategy given exogenous characteristics for each supplier (such as delivery time
and price). There are a number of papers (see Cachon 1998, 2003 for surveys) that study
supply-chain lead-time coordination in a multi-echelon inventory setting, but those papers
do not have asymmetric information, nor do they consider procurement costs. We touch
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upon the issue of renegotiation. See Plambeck and Zenios (2000) and Plambeck and Taylor
(2002) for other papers that discuss renegotiation, but in settings quite diﬀerent than ours.
4 Centralized management
This section defines and derives several useful functions and presents the optimal policy
for the supply chain. It is optimal for the supply chain to have one supplier (because the
capacity cost is linear in µ) and it is optimal to use a base-stock policy. Let N be the number
of outstanding orders at the supplier in steady state. N is geometrically distributed. The
buyer’s operating cost is
Co(µ, s) = E[h(s−N)+ + p(N − s)+] = h
µ
s− λ
µ− λ
¶
+ (h+ p)
µ
λ
µ
¶sµ
λ
µ− λ
¶
,
the supplier’s cost is Cs(µ, b) = bµ, and the supply chain’s total cost is
C(µ, s, b) = Co(µ, s) + Cs(µ, b),
where (x)+ = max(0, x), µ ≥ 0 and s ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...}. Because s is restricted to the set of
non-negative integers, it is not possible to provide a closed-form solution for the minimum
cost. So in the remainder of this paper we treat s as a continuous variable.
C (µ, s, b) is convex in s and let s∗(µ) be the optimal base stock level:
s∗(µ) = − ln
µµ
h
h+ p
¶µ
µ/λ− 1
ln(µ/λ)
¶¶
/ ln(µ/λ).
Given the optimal base stock level, the buyer’s operating cost is
Co(µ) = Co(µ, s
∗(µ)) = h


1− ln
³³
h
h+p
´³
µ/λ−1
lnµ/λ
´´
lnµ/λ
− 1
µ/λ− 1

 . (1)
and the supply chain’s total cost is
C(µ, b) = C(µ, s∗(µ), b) = Co(µ) + bµ.
According to the next theorem, Co(µ) is convex in µ. Consequently, C(µ, b) is convex in µ.
Let µ∗ (b) be the supply chain’s optimal capacity,
µ∗(b) = argmin
µ
C(µ, b),
and let C∗(b) = C(µ∗ (b) , b) be the supply chain minimum cost.
Theorem 1 The buyer’s operating cost, Co(µ), is convex in µ ≥ λ.
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All proofs are in the Appendix.
We later take advantage of an additional approximation of the supply chain’s cost function.
The exponential distribution is the continuous counterpart to the geometric distribution, so,
as an approximation for N, we may use an exponential distribution with the same mean as
the geometric distribution. This approximation tends to underestimate the average waiting
time, but it is justified in a heavy traﬃc analysis (see Caldentey and Wein 2003). Let
Cˆ(µ, s, b) be the supply chain’s cost function according to the exponential approximation:
Cˆ(µ, s, b) = Cˆo(µ, s) + bµ
where Cˆo(µ, s) is the buyer’s operating cost,
Cˆo(µ, s) = hs+
µ
(h+ p)e−s(µ/λ−1) − h
µ/λ− 1
¶
.
From Caldentey and Wein (2003), the unique global minimizers of Cˆ(µ, s, b) are
µˆ(b) = λ+
p
α/b and sˆ(b) =
p
bα/h2, where α = hλ ln((h+ p)/h).
The buyer’s minimum operating cost and the the supply chain’s optimal cost are then
Cˆo(µ) = Cˆo(µ, sˆ(b)) = α/ (µ− λ)
Cˆ(b) = Cˆ(µˆ(b), sˆ(b), b) = bλ+ 2
√
αb
We find that the supply chain’s cost is nearly minimized with capacity µˆ(b) as long as
utilization is reasonably high (say more than 0.17). See Zhang (2004) for details.
5 One potential supplier (n = 1)
In this section there is only one potential supplier (or the buyer has already selected her
supplier), so the buyer only needs to set the transfer payment. We begin with the optimal
mechanism, then consider supply chain coordination and finish with two simpler mechanisms.
5.1 Buyer’s optimal mechanism
Although the space of possible contracts is quite large, according to the Revelation Principle,
an optimal mechanism for the buyer is a menu of contracts that satisfies two constraints.
The menu is a pair of functions, {µ(x), R(x)}, such that the supplier chooses from this menu
by announcing his cost to be x, then he builds capacity µ(x) and the buyer pays him R(x)
per unit produced. One constraint imposed on this menu is the incentive compatibility
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constraint:
b = argmax
x
πs(x) = R(x)λ− bµ(x), (2)
i.e., the supplier’s true cost maximizes his profit, therefore he builds capacity µ(b) and
receives R(b) per unit delivered. The second is an individual rationality constraint:
πs(b) ≥ 0 for all b ∈ [b, b] (3)
i.e., the supplier participates only if his profit is non-negative (we assume zero profit is the
supplier’s best outside alternative). According to (3), the buyer designs a menu that even
the highest cost supplier accepts, which implicitly assumes there is a severe penalty for
failing to make an agreement with the supplier. (Corbett, Zhou and Tang 2001 relax this
assumption in a diﬀerent model.)
The buyer’s total cost (procurement and operating) is Rλ+Co(µ), and the buyer’s optimal
menu is the solution to the following problem:
min
µ(·),R(·)
Z b¯
b
(R(x)λ+ Co(µ(x))) f(x)dx
s.t. (2), (3)
(4)
Theorem 2 If F (x) is log-concave, then the buyer’s optimal menu of contracts to oﬀer the
supplier (i.e., the solution to ( 4)) is characterized by
C 0o(µ) = −x− F (x)/f(x)
R(x)λ = xµ(x) +
Z b¯
x
µ(y)dy.
The log-concave requirement on F (x) is suﬃcient (but not necessary) for the second order
condition on each buyer’s incentive compatibility constraint, (2). It is a mild restriction,
satisfied by many commonly used distributions (see Bagnoli and Bergstrom 1989 for details.)
With the buyer’s optimal mechanism the supplier builds less than the supply chain optimal
capacity, µ∗(b) (the optimal capacity satisfies C 0o(µ
∗) = −b, and Co(µ) is convex), hence, the
buyer sacrifices some ex post eﬃciency to increase her own profit. This is why the optimal
mechanism is vulnerable to renegotiation: after the suppliers announces his capacity, both
the buyer and the supplier can be better oﬀ if they renegotiate (choose µ∗(b) and a Pareto
division of the supply chain’s profit).
Because C 0o(µ) is complex, we do not have a closed-form solution for µ(x) and R(x). But
it is possible to evaluate numerically the optimal menu and the buyer’s expected cost.
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5.2 Supply chain coordination (CC)
Coordination requires that the supplier builds capacity µ∗(b), the supplier earns a non-
negative profit and the chosen base stock level is s∗(µ∗(b)). This can be done with the
following arrangement: charge the supplier h per unit in the buyer’s inventory and p per
unit in the buyer’s backorder, the supplier chooses s and the unit price is
Rc = C
¡
µ∗
¡
b¯
¢
, s∗
¡
b¯
¢
, b¯
¢
/λ.
This works because the supplier incurs all supply chain costs, so the supplier has an incentive
to choose µ∗(b) and s∗ (µ∗(b)) , and even the highest cost supplier earns a non-negative profit.
The buyer’s total cost is then C
¡
µ∗
¡
b¯
¢
, s∗
¡
b¯
¢
, b¯
¢
and the supplier’s profit is
πs = C
¡
µ∗
¡
b¯
¢
, s∗
¡
b¯
¢
, b¯
¢
− C (µ∗(b), s∗(b), b) .
This resembles Vendor Managed Inventory (because the supplier chooses s) with consignment
and service penalties. Supply chain coordination is not achievable with a simpler mechanism:
because only the supplier knows b, only a full transfer of the buyer’s operating cost to the
supplier results in the supplier choosing µ∗(b), and due to the full transfer of costs, the
supplier must also choose the buyer’s base stock level.
5.3 Late-fee mechanism (LF)
With a late-fee mechanism the buyer pays the supplier Rf per unit and charges the supplier
η per outstanding order per unit time. This mechanism is simple to explain (just two
parameters, no menu), easy to implement (it is based on data verifiable by both parties,
the number of outstanding orders) and it is observed in practice (e.g., Beth et al. 2003).
Although we would ideally like to find the optimal pair {Rf , η}, the complexity of Co(µ, b)
precludes a closed-form solution. As an alternative, we take advantage of the exponential
approximation for N to derive closed-form solutions for Rf and η. We show in §7 that this
approximation yields excellent results.
Let Cs(µ, b) and µ∗f(b) be the supplier’s cost and optimal capacity:
Cs(µ, b) = bµ+ ηλ/(µ− λ)
µ∗f(b) = argmin
µ
Cs(µ, b) = λ+
p
ηλ/b
Recall, µˆ(b) = λ+
p
α/b minimizes Cˆ(µ, sˆ(b), b). Matching µ∗f(b) with µˆ(b) yields
ηf = h ln
µ
h+ p
h
¶
: (5)
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if the late fee is ηf , then the supplier minimizes his cost with capacity µˆ(b), which also hap-
pens to be the capacity that minimizes Cˆ(µ, sˆ(b), b), the supply chain’s cost function based
on the exponential approximation. Hence, ηf coordinates the approximate cost system. It
does not coordinate the actual supply chain, but, as we already mentioned, it essentially
does so when the optimal utilization is not too low.
To ensure participation, the buyer should pay Rf per delivered unit such that
πs(b¯) = Rfλ− b¯µˆ(b¯)− ηf
µ
λ
µˆ(b¯)− λ
¶
= 0,
which yields
Rf = b¯+ 2
q
αb¯/λ. (6)
Because N does not depend on s, with the late-fee mechanism the buyer’s optimal base stock
level is s∗(µˆ(b)).
5.4 Lead-time mechanism (LT)
The lead-time mechanism is another simple mechanism for the buyer: the buyer merely tells
the supplier the lead-time that must be delivered and how much the buyer pays for each
unit. Due to the one-to-one relationship between the delivered lead time and the supplier’s
capacity, we can think of this mechanism in terms of two parameters, µt andRt, the supplier’s
required capacity and the buyer’s price per unit respectively. We assume the supplier must
build capacity µt if the supplier accepts the contract, i.e., there is a substantial penalty for
failing to adhere to the agreement. (We discuss this further in section 9.)
The supplier’s expected profit is πs = λRt − bµt. To ensure participation, the unit price
must be Rt(µt) = b¯µt/λ. The buyer’s cost is then
Co (µt) + λRt (µt) = Co (µt) + b¯µt
which is the supply chain’s cost with the highest capacity cost, C(µt, b¯). Hence, the buyer’s
optimal lead time requirement is (µt−λ)−1, where µt = µ∗(b¯), and the buyer pays the supplier
Rt(µ
∗(b¯)) per unit. Interestingly, from the buyer’s perspective this mechanism is equivalent
to the supply chain coordination mechanism. But unlike the supply chain coordination
mechanism, the supply chain optimal capacity is chosen only when the supplier’s cost is b¯.
6 Competitive bidding (n ≥ 2)
Now suppose there are at least two potential suppliers, so competitive bidding is possible.
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We evaluate an optimal mechanism and several other auction types when the suppliers’
costs are identical or heterogeneous. With heterogeneous suppliers we employ the following
random variables: let b˜ and bl be the lowest costs among n− 1 and n suppliers respectively,
and let bs be the second lowest cost among n suppliers. Let G and g be the cdf and pdf of
b˜ and bs (i.e., they have the same distribution).
6.1 A scoring-rule auction (SA)
With a scoring-rule auction suppliers submit bids that contain a price and a lead time
and the buyer evaluates these bids by assigning each bid a value via a publicly announced
function (i.e., the scoring rule). Because from the buyer’s perspective there is a one-to-one
relationship between lead time and capacity, we shall assume, without loss of generality,
that the suppliers submit {µ,R} bids, i.e., a capacity and a unit price. Let Y (µ,R) be the
buyer’s scoring rule and let Yi be the ith highest score. The winner is the supplier whose
bid has the highest score. In the first-bid auction the winner must deliver his bid. With
the second-bid auction the winner chooses any {µ,R} pair such that Y2 = Y (µ,R) (i.e., the
winner does not have to exactly match the 2nd best bid, he matches the 2nd best bid’s score.)
There are many possible scoring rules, but we work with an intuitive one: let the buyer’s
scoring rule be YB(µ,R), which is the buyer’s total cost,
YB(µ,R) = Co(µ) +Rλ.
So the highest score refers to the lowest total cost. Due to the next lemma, we can think of
the suppliers as if they are bidding on bµ∗(b) + πs, the supply chain’s optimal capacity cost
plus a profit.
Lemma 3 In a (first or second bid) scoring-rule auction with the buyer’s total cost as the
scoring rule, YB(µ,R), the dominant strategy for a supplier with cost b is to bid the supply
chain optimal capacity µ∗(b).
Theorem 4 Consider the total cost, YB(µ,R), scoring-rule auction:
i. With identical suppliers: the suppliers bid (µ∗(b), R(b)) in equilibrium, where R(x) =
xµ∗(x)/λ; the winner is randomly picked and earns zero profit; and this is an optimal
procurement mechanism for the buyer (i.e., minimizes the buyer’s total cost).
ii. With heterogeneous suppliers and first bid the unique symmetric equilibrium bidding
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strategy is
µ(x) = µ∗(x),
R(x)λ = −Co(µ∗(x)) +
1
(1−G(x))
Z b¯
x
C∗(y)g(y)dy
iii. With heterogeneous suppliers and second bid, it is a dominant strategy to bid according
to µ(x) = µ∗(x) and R(x) = xµ∗(x)/λ.
With identical suppliers the buyer can coordinate the supply chain and extracts all its
profit using a scoring-rule auction, even if she does not know the suppliers’ cost. Therefore
the total cost scoring-rule auction is optimal among all possible strategies. Furthermore,
the buyer achieves this desirable outcome with as few as two suppliers.
With heterogeneous suppliers, Che (1993) proves the revenue equivalence result holds
here, i.e., the buyer is indiﬀerent between first bid and second-bid. (He considers bids on
price and quality, but his results also apply here.) The intuition is straightforward: the
suppliers are bidding on the buyer’s total cost function, so the buyer only cares about her
expected total cost, not the variance of her total cost. Che (1993) also shows that this
scoring rule is not optimal for the buyer (the buyer is better oﬀ distorting the supplier to a
lower than optimal capacity). This is also true in our model, as we next provide an optimal
mechanism for heterogeneous suppliers.
6.2 Optimal mechanism with heterogeneous suppliers (OM)
Similar to the case of n = 1, when n ≥ 2 the buyer oﬀers to the suppliers a menu,
{qi(·), µi(·), Ri(·)}, where i ∈ [1, n]: supplier i is the winner with probability qi(bˆ) ≥ 0,
where bˆ = (bˆ1, · · · , bˆn) is the vector of announced costs andP qi(bˆ) = 1; supplier i receives
a unit price Ri(bˆ) from the buyer; the winner builds capacity µi(bˆ); and the losers do nothing
but enjoy their payment.
Consider the suppliers’ bidding behavior. Supplier i maximizes her own expected profit:
max
bˆi
πis = Ebˆ−i [R
i(bˆ)λ− qi(bˆ)biµi(bˆ)].
According to the Revelation Principle, we need only consider truth telling mechanisms,
bi = argmax
bˆi
πis(bˆ
i). (7)
The individual rationality constraints is
πis(b
i) ≥ 0. (8)
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Let b = (b1, · · · , bn) be the true cost vector. The buyer’s problem is
min{qi(·),µi(·),Ri(·)} Eb{
Pn
i R
i(b)λ+
Pn
i [q
i(b)Co(µ
i(b)]}
s.t. (7) and (8) (9)
The following theorem gives the solution to (9).
Theorem 5 If F (·) is log-concave then in the optimal mechanism for n ≥ 2 heterogeneous
suppliers the suppliers announce their true costs and the most eﬃcient supplier is chosen.
The same menu is oﬀered to the suppliers with functions given by
q(bˆ) =
½
1 if bˆi = min (bˆ1, · · · , bˆn)
0 otherwise
C 0o(µ) = −x− F (x)/f(x),
R(x)λ = (1− F (x))n−1xµ(x) +
Z b¯
x
(1− F (y))n−1µ(y)dy,
From Theorems (2) and (5) we see that the incentive scheme (i.e., the capacity function
µ(x)) applies for all n. So, again, the optimal mechanism results in less capacity than optimal
for the supply chain. We numerically evaluate the functions in Theorem 5.
This optimal mechanism is strange in that the losers receive a payment even though they
do not build any capacity. However, it is possible to show that the optimal mechanism can
be implemented so that only the winner receives a payment (see Zhang 2004).
6.3 Lead-time mechanism with a price auction (LT)
One idea to simplify the scoring-rule auction is to reduce its dimensionality: fix one of the
dimensions and have the suppliers bid on the other dimension. In the lead time mechanism
with a price auction the buyer announces the lead time the selected supplier must deliver and
the selected supplier is the winner of a price auction. (This is the natural extension of the
lead time mechanism with one potential supplier to n ≥ 2 potential suppliers.) FreeMarkets
runs auctions like this; see Rangan (1998). As before, we analyze this mechanism as if the
buyer announces a required capacity, µ, instead of a lead time.
Theorem 6 Consider the lead time mechanism with price auction.
i. With n identical suppliers, the unique equilibrium (with first or second bid) is R(x) =
µx/λ, where the required lead time is (µ− λ)−1. The winner earns zero profit and the
buyer’s expected total cost, µE[b] + Co(µ), is convex in µ.
ii. With n heterogeneous suppliers, the equilibrium bidding strategy with first bid is
ϕI(x) =
µ
λ
E(b˜|b˜ > x),
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and with second bid the weakly dominant strategy is ϕII(x) = µx/λ; first bid and
second bid yield the same total cost to the buyer, µE[bs] +Co(µ), which is convex in µ.
In the price auction, because the required capacity is given, the suppliers essentially bid on
their profit. Hence, the revenue equivalence result follows immediately (part 2 of Theorem
6). Given the buyer’s total cost is convex in µ, a numerical search finds the optimal required
capacity (i.e., lead time).
6.4 Late-fee mechanism with a price auction (LF)
In the late fee mechanism with a price auction the buyer charges the winner of the price
auction the late fee ηf per outstanding order per unit time. This is similar to the lead time
mechanism in that the selection of the supplier is based only on the suppliers’ price bids,
but it is diﬀerent in that now the winning supplier is free to choose his capacity/lead time
to minimize his own costs. Because the winner’s price bid does not influence his capacity
choice, the winner chooses capacity µˆ(b). As a result, with either first or second bid the
suppliers eﬀectively bid their capacity cost, bµˆ(b), plus a profit. As with one potential
supplier, ηf is not the buyer’s optimal late fee, but we show in §7 that it is quite good. The
results for this mechanism are summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 7 Consider the late fee mechanism with a price auction and the late fee ηf .
i. With n identical suppliers, the unique equilibrium bid (with first or second bid) is
R(x) = Cˆ(x)/λ. The winner is chosen randomly and earns zero profit.
ii. With n heterogeneous suppliers: the unique equilibrium bidding strategy with first bid
is
µ(x) = µˆ(x)
R(x) =
1
λ(1−G(x))
Z b¯
x
Cˆ(y)g(y)dy =
1
λ
E
³
Cˆ(b˜)|b˜ > x
´
and with second bid the dominant strategy is µ(x) = µˆ(x) and R(x) = Cˆ(x)/λ; First
bid and second bid yield the same expected total cost to the buyer.
7 Numerical study
This section reports on a numerical study of the procurement strategies analyzed in the
previous two sections. We constructed 144 scenarios from all combinations of the following
parameters: h = 1, λ ∈ {0.1, 1, 10, 100}, p ∈ {3, 40, 200}, b is uniformly distributed on the
interval [b, b¯] where b = θ − δ and b¯ = θ + δ, θ ∈ {0.5, 5, 50, 200} and δ ∈ {0.05θ, 0.1θ, 0.2θ}.
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We take the scenarios with δ = 0.05θ to represent reasonably small uncertainty with respect
to the suppliers’ cost (within 5% of forecast) and the scenarios with δ = 0.20θ to represent
high uncertainty (it is unlikely that qualified suppliers would have costs that range more
than 20% from the buyer’s forecast). We fix h to a single value, because it is easy to show
that the buyer’s cost depends on the ratios p/h and b/(p/h), so it is suﬃcient to vary p and
b and hold h fixed. Because backorder penalty costs are generally higher than holding costs,
we allow p to range from a low value of three times h to a high value of two hundred times h.
Similarly, because of economies of scale in queuing systems, we range the demand rate for a
low of 0.1 to a high of 100. Capacity costs range from very low, θ = 0.5, which generally
results in low utilizations, to very high, θ = 200, which generally results in high utilizations.
Table 1 contains a list of the strategies we evaluate and the mnemonics we use to identify
each one in the subsequent tables. With the competitive bidding strategies we assume there
are two potential suppliers and we consider both identical and heterogeneous suppliers.
Table 2 provides data on the performances of each strategy relative to the optimal mecha-
nism. With a single potential supplier, both the supply chain coordination mechanism (CC)
and the late-fee mechanism (LF) are nearly optimal. In fact, LF even performs slightly
better than CC at the 90th percentile because (we conjecture) it makes the supplier build
less capacity than optimal, just like the optimal mechanism. We found that ηf is nearly
the optimal late fee, so there is little value to numerically search for the optimal late-fee
mechanism. Figure 1 illustrates this result for a sample of the scenarios. It also illustrates
that it is possible to increase costs substantially with a poorly chosen late fee.
In competitive bidding and identical suppliers, the scoring-rule auction (SA) is optimal
for the buyer. The performance of the late-fee mechanism (LF) is very close to SA, again,
even though ηf is chosen via an approximation. The percentage cost increase relative to SA
is less than 0.36% among 90% of the scenarios. The lead-time mechanism (LT) performs
slightly better than LF. However, Zhang (2004) reports in a broader numerical study that LT
performs worse than the LF when there is significant (and probably unrealistic) uncertainty
in the supplier’s cost.
With two heterogeneous suppliers, the scoring rule auction (SA) is no longer optimal,
but it still generates total costs that are close to the optimal mechanism. Both the lead
time (LT) and the late-fee mechanisms (LF) generate good results for the buyer. LF is
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least eﬀective when both the capacity cost and the demand rate are very low (e.g., θ = 0.5,
λ = 0.1) because then the exponential approximation is not accurate due to very low system
utilization.
Overall, we see from Table 2 that the late fee and lead-time mechanisms perform quite
well. To test the robustness of these mechanisms, we constructed another set of 144 scenarios
that are identical to the first with the one exception that in each scenario the capacity cost
distribution is changed from a uniform distribution with mean θ and range [θ− δ, θ + δ] to
a normal distribution with mean θ and standard deviation δ/4. Table 3 summarizes those
results. In short, both mechanisms continue to perform well when the uncertainty in the
suppliers’ cost is normally distributed.
We find that the buyer is much better oﬀ with two potential suppliers than only one
potential supplier (when optimal mechanisms are used): on average the buyer’s cost is 7.8%
lower with two identical suppliers and 5.3% lower with two heterogenous suppliers relative
to just one potential supplier.
Table 4 provides data on the incentive to renegotiate with the mechanisms that do not
coordinate the supply chain. We see that the optimal mechanisms do create some opportu-
nity for renegotiation, but that opportunity is generally relatively small (less than 1% for all
scenarios). The late-fee mechanism also presents a small opportunity for renegotiation in
most of the scenarios, except if the system utilization is very low (e.g. when the capacity cost
and demand rate are very low). Again, this is because ηf is derived from the exponential ap-
proximation, which is less accurate for systems with very low utilization. The renegotiation
opportunity with the lead-time mechanisms is comparable to the late-fee mechanisms.
To summarize, we observe in an extensive numerical study that the lead time and late-
fee mechanisms perform for the buyer nearly as well as the optimal mechanisms and they
generally create a relatively small renegotiation opportunity (i.e., they nearly coordinate the
supply chain).
8 Two extensions
This section provides two extensions to the model: the buyer’s holding cost is allowed to
vary linearly with the buyer’s procurement cost or the buyer operates in a make-to-order
fashion, so the buyer does not hold inventory.
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8.1 Generalized holding cost
Now let h be a function of the unit cost, h = h0+ rc, where h0 is a constant representing the
physical holding cost, r is the interest rate and c is the buyer’s unit cost, which may diﬀer
from the unit price R. For example, the buyer’s unit cost with a late fee is R minus the late
fee per unit. The buyer’s operating cost is
Co(µ, c) =



(h0 + rc)
·
1−ln
³³
h0+rc
h0+rc+p
´
(µ/λ−1lnµ/λ )
´
lnµ/λ
− 1
µ/λ−1
¸
if s∗(µ) > 0
p
µ/λ−1 if s
∗(µ) ≤ 0.
(10)
Due to the continuous approximation of s, s∗(µ) < 0 and hence Co(µ, c) < 0 is possible,
so we need to adjust Co(µ, c) for those outcomes. (With a fixed holding cost we did not
encounter any situation in which Co(µ, c) < 0, so that adjustment was not necessary in those
scenarios.)
Unfortunately, the evaluation of the optimal mechanism with this new holding cost struc-
ture is quite diﬃcult. There are several complications. First, Co(µ, c) is not always jointly
convex nor everywhere diﬀerentiable, which prevents finding solutions via first order condi-
tions. Second, the transfer payment and the operating cost are no longer separable (i.e.,
the transfer payment can no longer be chosen arbitrarily for a given capacity and operating
cost), which significantly complicates the evaluation of the optimal transfer payment and
capacity function. As a result, full enumeration over the contract space is required to eval-
uate an optimal mechanism. Hence, we can only determine the optimal mechanism when
the suppliers’ costs are drawn from a discrete distribution and the suppliers are only allowed
to choose capacities from a discrete set.
The process for evaluating the lead-time mechanism does not require an adjustment due to
the variable holding cost. On the other hand, the late-fee mechanism requires an adjustment
because the supply chain optimal capacity with the exponential approximation, µˆ(b), no
longer takes a simple form proportional to
p
1/b. We first find the capacity that minimizes
the supply chain’s cost when b = θ (recall θ is the mean of the cost distribution):
µθ = argmin
µ
(Co(µ, θ) + θµ).
Unfortunately, there is no closed form solution for µθ, but only a one dimensional search is
needed to find µθ. Given the late fee ηf , the supplier’s optimal capacity is µf = λ+
q
ηfλ/θ.
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Equating µθ with µf yields
ηf = θ(µθ − λ)2/λ.
Hence, we set the late fee to coordinate the supply chain with the average cost supplier.
With two or more suppliers, an auction sets the price R. With a single potential supplier,
R is chosen so that the high cost supplier earns zero profit:
Rf = b¯+ 2
q
ηf b¯/λ.
To test this version of the late-fee mechanism, we take the original set of 144 scenarios
and add three interest rate levels, r = {0.05, 0.1, 0.2}, to arrive at 432 scenarios. For each
scenario, we divide the cost support [θ−δ, θ+δ] intom−1 equal intervals and assume each are
equally likely (i.e., a discrete uniform distribution). Similarly, we divide the range [1.1λ, 10λ]
into n − 1 equal intervals and use the n interval boundaries as the feasible capacities. As
m and n are increased, our discrete problem approaches the continuous problem we studied
with a fixed holding cost. However, as we already mentioned, the computational burden
increases rapidly with m and n. In our numerical study, we set m = 5 and n = 20.
Table 5 displays the performance of the lead time and late-fee mechanisms relative to
the optimal mechanisms. Even with this holding cost, the both mechanisms are nearly
optimal with either a single supplier or identical suppliers. With heterogeneous suppliers
the mechanisms perform well, but now the average cost increase is a noticeable 2.61% with
either mechanism. We suspect that this gap with the optimal mechanism is in large part
due to our coarse discretization because the gap decreases quickly as the number of supplier
cost realizations (m) increases. (For a sample of the scenarios we were able to test m = 7
and m = 9). From the supply chain’s perspective, these mechanisms are also near optimal,
so renegotiation is again not an issue (see Table 6). Overall, we conclude that the lead time
and late-fee mechanisms perform quite well even when the holding cost is a linear function
of the buyer’s procurement cost.
8.2 Make-to-order buyer
If the buyer is a make-to-order manufacturer or a service provider, then the buyer is unable
to hold buﬀer inventory to mitigate the consequence of slow delivery. Hence, we investigate
whether the lead time and late-fee mechanisms perform well in this setting.
The buyer’s operating cost is Co(µ) = λp/(µ−λ). Theorem 5 still applies because Co(µ)
is convex, so we can evaluate the optimal mechanism for this case. It is easy to show
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that the buyer’s optimal lead-time mechanism has µt = λ +
p
pλ/b¯ and the unit price
Rt(µt) = b¯+
p
pb¯/λ.
There are two natural approaches for the late-fee mechanism. One approach is to transfer
the buyer’s backorder cost to the supplier: η1f = p and R = b¯ + 2
p
pb¯/λ. That approach
coordinates the supply chain because the supplier incurs all operating costs and chooses all
actions (in this case the only action is the capacity).
A second approach is to find the buyer’s optimal late fee with one potential supplier.
With the supplier’s optimal capacity, µ∗f(b), the supplier’s profit is
πs(µf , b) = Rλ− (bλ+ 2
q
ηfλb).
Setting πs(µf , b¯) = 0 gives the optimal transfer price:
Rf = b¯+ 2
q
ηf b¯/λ.
The buyer’s expected cost with {ηf , Rf} is
Cb = b¯λ+ 2
q
ηfλb¯+ (p− ηf)
q
λ/ηfE
³√
b
´
,
which is convex in ηf and minimized by
η2f =


E
³√
b
´
2
√
b¯− E
³√
b
´

 p. (11)
With heterogenous suppliers the unit price with either late-fee is determined via an auction.
Table 7 reports that all three of these procurement strategies perform well with the sce-
narios defined in §7. Comparing the two late-fee mechanisms, η2f is better with one potential
supplier (because then it is the optimal late fee) and two heterogeneous suppliers, and η1f
is better with identical suppliers (because then it is optimal). There is no renegotiation
opportunity with η1f because the supplier chooses the supply chain optimal capacity. The
renegotiation values for the other strategies are given in Table 8: the supply chain ineﬃciency
is positive but very small.
9 Discussion
A buyer procures a component from a single supplier whose capacity cost is unknown to
the buyer. There are two tasks in the buyer’s procurement strategy, supplier selection
(which supplier to source from) and contract terms (how much to pay the supplier). Two
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situations are considered: with one potential supplier the buyer need only choose contract
terms whereas with two or more potential suppliers the two procurement tasks (selection
and contract terms) are bundled. With n ≥ 2 we consider two versions: with identical
suppliers the suppliers have the same capacity cost, whereas with heterogeneous suppliers
each supplier’s capacity cost is an independent draw from the same distribution.
In our base model the buyer holds inventory and the inventory holding cost is a constant.
We identify optimal procurement strategies for the buyer and provide alternative strategies
as well, in particular, simple mechanisms with a few fixed parameters rather than menus
of non-linear functions. We judge each mechanism along two key dimensions: how well it
minimizes the buyer’s total cost (procurement plus operating) and how well it minimizes
the supply chain’s cost. If a mechanism does not score well on the latter dimension, then
the mechanism may not be implementable due to the threat of renegotiation. Our main
finding is that there exist simple mechanisms that are eﬀective along both dimensions. One
is a late-fee mechanism: the buyer charges the supplier fixed late fee for on-order units and
either sets the unit price (with one potential supplier) or conducts an auction to set the unit
price. The other is a lead-time mechanism: the buyer sets a fixed lead time requirement
and uses the same procedure as the late-fee mechanism to set the unit price.
Although the lead time and late-fee mechanisms perform similarly, the lead-time mech-
anism has one disadvantage relative to the late-fee mechanism: compliance is harder to
enforce. To explain, it is easy to imagine that the firms could disagree over whether the
supplier has built the correct amount of capacity, because even if the correct capacity were
built, the buyer cannot infer with certainty the supplier’s capacity from the supplier’s re-
alized lead times. In other words, it is diﬃcult for the buyer to distinguish between an
unlucky (but honest) supplier and a cheating supplier. In contrast, it is easy for the firms
to verify the number of outstanding orders, so a dispute is less likely to erupt between the
parties with a late-fee mechanism.
For each procurement strategy with multiple potential suppliers we evaluated both a
first bid and a second-bid auction. Even though these two auction formats have diﬀerent
equilibrium bidding strategies, we show that revenue equivalence holds in our setting, i.e.,
the buyer’s expected total cost is the same with either format. However, this should not
be taken to imply that revenue equivalence holds with all procurement strategies. Zhang
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(2004) demonstrates that revenue equivalence does not hold if the buyer sets a fixed price
and conducts a lead time auction (i.e., suppliers bid a lead time and the winner is the one
with the lowest lead time bid). With that mechanism the buyer prefers first bid over second
bid because although the two have the same expected lead time bid, the variance of the lead
time bids is lower with first bid. Interestingly, Zhang (2004) also shows that the buyer’s cost
with that mechanism, even with the first bid format, is significantly higher than optimal,
which suggests that not all simple mechanisms are eﬀective. Figure 1 further emphasizes
this point: although the buyer’s cost is relatively flat about the optimal late fee, it is possible
to choose a late fee that significantly increases the buyer’s cost.
To summarize, this research is about how a buyer should procure when both procurement
and operating costs are important. It has been frequently articulated in the procurement
literature that a buyer should not focus on just the purchase price, but rather on the total
procurement cost. Unfortunately, there has been no rigorous analysis of how a buyer should
go about balancing price with operating costs. The mechanism design literature suggests
an approach that uses a menu of contracts to minimizes the buyer’s total cost, albeit at
the expense of supply chain ineﬃciency. The supply chain coordination literature seeks
to maximize the supply chain’s eﬃciency, but ignores the likely possibility of asymmetric
information. Neither approach (mechanism design or supply chain coordination) values a
simple design explicitly. Our practical approach is a blend of all three. For both simplicity
and outstanding performance (the buyer’s and the supply chain’s), we recommend either the
lead time or the late-fee mechanisms.
Table 1. Procurement strategies evaluated in the numerical study
OM Optimal mechanism (minimizes the buyer’s cost)
CC Supply chain coordination mechanism (minimizes total supply chain cost)
LF Late-fee mechanism: the buyer pays Rf per unit but charges the supplier the
late fee ηf per outstanding order per unit time. With one potential supplier,
Rf is chosen by the buyer, otherwise it is chosen via a price auction.
LT Lead-time mechanism: the buyer pays Rt per unit and requires the supplier
to achieve the lead time (µt− λ)−1. With one potential supplier, Rt is chosen
by the buyer, otherwise it is chosen via a price auction.
SA Scoring-rule auction: the scoring rule is YB(µ,R), which is the buyer’s cost
with unit price R and capacity µ; the winning supplier bids the lowest score
and then must achieve his bid.
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Table 2. Cost comparisons among strategies. For each strategy, the percentiles of the
percentage cost increase relative to the optimal strategy are presented.
min 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% max average
Single CC and LT 0 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.11 0.24 0.56 0.09
supplier LF 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.13 0.19 2.85 0.20
Identical LT 0 0 0 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.24 0.03
suppliers LF 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.36 3.54 0.25
Heterogeneous SA 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.18 0.26 0.47 0.16
suppliers LT 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.19 0.31 0.59 0.18
LF 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.22 0.31 3.27 0.32
Table 3. Performance of strategies when the capacity cost distribution is normal
with mean θ and standard deviation δ/4. For each setting, the percentiles of the
percentage cost increase relative to the optimal strategy are presented.
min 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% max average
Single LT 0.02 0.05 0.12 0.32 0.67 1.20 2.39 0.50
supplier LF 0.01 0.05 0.11 0.34 0.79 1.38 3.53 0.60
Identical LT 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.12 0.01
suppliers LF 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.35 3.54 0.25
Heterogeneous LT 0 0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.12 0.02
suppliers LF 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.27 3.40 0.23
Table 4. The supply chain ineﬃciency (the value of renegotiation). The subscript e
denotes the expected supply chain ineﬃciency ex ante, the subscript max denotes the
maximum possible supply chain ineﬃciency ex post.
min 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% max average
OMe 0 0 0.01 0.03 0.10 0.23 0.51 0.08
OMmax 0 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.24 0.51 1.11 0.19
Single LTe 0 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.12 0.30 0.67 0.10
supplier LTmax 0 0.02 0.05 0.13 0.39 1.10 2.37 0.36
LFe 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.36 3.53 0.25
LFmax 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.45 4.38 0.27
LTe 0 0 0 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.20 0.03
Identical LTmax 0 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.11 0.34 0.73 0.11
suppliers LFe 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.36 3.53 0.25
LFmax 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.45 4.38 0.27
OMe 0 0 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.14 0.30 0.05
OMmax 0 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.24 0.51 1.11 0.19
Heterogeneous LTe 0 0 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.18 0.41 0.06
suppliers LTmax 0 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.19 0.56 1.21 0.18
LFe 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.39 3.78 0.25
LFmax 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.45 4.38 0.27
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Table 5. Performance of strategies with h = h0+ rc. For each setting, the percentiles
of the percentage cost increase relative to the optimal strategy are presented.
min 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% max average
Single LT 0 0 0 0 0.10 0.66 2.22 0.15
supplier LF 0 0 0 0 0.11 0.64 3.70 0.18
Identical LT 0 0 0 0 0 0.04 1.13 0.02
suppliers LF 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 1.13 0.02
Heterogeneous LT 0.34 0.90 1.22 1.99 3.74 4.53 12.19 2.61
suppliers LF 0.34 0.90 1.22 1.99 3.74 4.60 11.87 2.61
Table 6. The supply chain ineﬃciency (the value of renegotiation) with h = h0 + rc.
The subscript e denotes the expected supply chain ineﬃciency ex ante, the subscript
max denotes the maximum possible supply chain ineﬃciency ex post.
min 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% max average
LTe 0 0 0 0 0 0.06 1.43 0.04
Single LTmax 0 0 0 0 0 0.23 4.89 0.14
supplier LFe 0 0 0 0 0 0.06 1.13 0.03
LFmax 0 0 0 0 0 0.21 4.89 0.09
LTe 0 0 0 0 0 0.04 1.13 0.02
Identical LTmax 0 0 0 0 0 0.17 4.89 0.09
suppliers LFe 0 0 0 0 0 0.06 1.13 0.03
LFmax 0 0 0 0 0 0.21 4.89 0.09
LTe 0 0 0 0 0 0.04 2.21 0.02
Heterogeneous LTmax 0 0 0 0 0 0.17 4.89 0.09
suppliers LFe 0 0 0 0 0 0.04 2.04 0.02
LFmax 0 0 0 0 0 0.21 4.89 0.09
Table 7. Performance of strategies with s = 0. For each setting, the percentiles of
the percentage cost increase relative to the optimal strategy are presented.
min 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% max average
LT 0 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.16 0.40 0.55 0.13
Single LF (η1f) 0 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.16 0.40 0.55 0.13
supplier LF (η2f) 0 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.03
LT 0 0 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.14 0.24 0.04
Identical LF (η1f) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
suppliers LF (η2f) 0 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.13 0.33 0.39 0.10
LT 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.17 0.25 0.43 0.51 0.21
Heterogeneous LF (η1f) 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.22 0.35 0.47 0.19
suppliers LF (η2f) 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.16 0.20 0.24 0.14
23
Table 8. The supply chain ineﬃciency (the value of renegotiation) with s = 0. The
subscript e denotes the expected supply chain ineﬃciency ex ante, the subscript max
denotes the maximum possible supply chain ineﬃciency ex post.
min 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% max average
LTe 0 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.19 0.49 0.58 0.15
Single LTmax 0 0.04 0.09 0.29 0.73 1.74 2.05 0.53
supplier LFe 0 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.13 0.33 0.39 0.10
LFmax 0 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.14 0.33 0.39 0.11
LTe 0 0 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.14 0.17 0.04
Identical LTmax 0 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.22 0.53 0.62 0.16
suppliers LFe 0 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.13 0.33 0.39 0.10
LFmax 0 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.14 0.33 0.39 0.11
LTe 0 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.12 0.29 0.35 0.09
Heterogeneous LTmax 0 0.02 0.04 0.14 0.37 0.87 1.03 0.26
suppliers LFe 0 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.13 0.33 0.39 0.10
LFmax 0 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.14 0.33 0.39 0.11
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Figure 1: Buyer’s total cost with a late-fee mechanism relative to the optimal mechanism
for four scenarios with one potential supplier. The x-axis is scaled so that in each scenario
ηf/2, ηf and 2ηf coincide.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1: Co(µ) is convex in µ if C 00o (φ) ≥ 0, where φ = µ/λ,
C 00o (φ) = h
·
−1− (lnφ+ 2)(ln k + ln(φ− 1)− ln(lnφ))
φ2(lnφ)3
+
2
φ(φ− 1)(lnφ)2 +
1
(φ− 1)2 lnφ −
2
(φ− 1)3
¸
,
where k = h/(h+ p). C 00o (φ) ≥ 0 if g(φ) ≥ 0 for φ > 1, where
g(φ) = 2φ(φ− 1)2 lnφ− (φ− 1)3 − 2φ2(lnφ)3 + φ2(φ− 1)(lnφ)2
−(φ− 1)3(lnφ+ 2)(ln(φ− 1)− ln(lnφ)).
A simple plot reveals g(φ) ≥ 0 for all φ > 1. A more rigorous proof, based on Taylor series
expansions, is provided by Zhang (2004).¤
Proof of Theorem 2: This is a special case of the proof for Theorem 5.
Proof of Lemma 3: For a fixed score y, the following program determines a supplier’s bid,
(µ,R), because the supplier’s probability of winning depends only on y:
maxµ,R πs = Rλ− bµ
s.t. Co(µ) +Rλ = y
.
Substitute the constraint into the profit function:
max
µ
πs = y − Co(µ)− bµ⇔ min
µ
C(µ, b),
i.e., the supplier chooses µ to minimize the system’s total cost. ¤
Proof of Theorem 4: From Lemma 3, µ∗(x) is a supplier’s dominant strategy, so the sup-
plier’s profit is Rλ− bµ∗(b). (i) given the suppliers know they have identical costs, the only
equilibrium bidding strategy is R(b) = bµ∗(b)/λ, which is the supplier’s break even unit price:
with any higher price there exists some other supplier that is willing to undercut the price
by a small amount. (ii) We only need to consider the score, y, a supplier bids. Assume all
suppliers implement the bidding strategy ϕ(x) = Co(µ∗(x)) +R(x)λ and ϕ(x) is decreasing.
Supplier 1 wins if he submits the lowest score, i.e. if x < b˜ or equivalently ϕ−1(y) < b˜.
Supplier 1’s expected profit is
π1 = (y − Co(µ∗(x))− xµ∗(x)) Pr(b˜ > ϕ−1(y))
= (y − C∗(x))(1−G(ϕ−1(y))).
The first-order condition for the optimal y is
(1−G(ϕ−1(y))− (ϕ(x)− C∗(x)) g(ϕ
−1(y))
ϕ0(ϕ−1(y))
= 0.
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Because x = ϕ−1(y), rearranging the above yields,
d
dx
(ϕ(x)(1−G(x))) = C∗(x)g(x),
which implies,
ϕ(x)(1−G(x)) =
Z x
b
C∗(y)g(y)dy +K, (12)
where K is a constant. The left hand side is zero at x = b¯. Equating the right hand side to
zero at x = b¯ yields
K = −
Z b¯
b
C∗(y)g(y)dy. (13)
Combining (13) and (12) yields
ϕ(x) =
1
1−G(x)
Z b¯
x
C∗(y)g(y)dy = E(C∗(b˜)|b˜ > x).
The result follows because R(x)λ = ϕ(x)−Co(µ∗(x)). (iii) With second bid it is a dominant
strategy to bid the minimum price the supplier is willing to receive, R(x) = bµ∗(x)/λ.¤
Proof of Theorem 5: The proof is adapted from Laﬀont and Tirole (1987). We provide a
sketch of the proof; Zhang (2004) provides a complete proof. A necessary condition for
truth telling is
∂
∂bˆi
Ebˆ−iR
i(bˆ)λ=
∂
∂bˆi
Ebˆ−i [q
i(bˆ)biµi(bˆ)] at bˆi = bi for all i. (14)
We now assume that qi(·) and µi(·) are nonincreasing functions in bi, and check later that
they are indeed nonincreasing in the optimal mechanism. It follows that the first order
condition (14) is suﬃcient for truth telling (see Zhang 2004).
Define U i(bi) to be the expected profit for supplier i under truth telling:
U i(bi) = Eb−i [R
i(b)λ− qi(b)biµi(b)]. (15)
From (14) and (15) we have
U˙ i(bi) = −Eb−i [qi(b)µi(b)]. (16)
We can see that U i is nonincreasing in bi, so we can set
U i(b¯) = 0, all i. (17)
The buyer’s problem now is
min{qi(·),µi(·),U i(·)} Eb{
Pn
i U
i(b)+
Pn
i [q
i(b)(biµi(b)+Co(µ
i(b))]}
s.t. (16) and (17) (18)
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According to Zhang (2004), letting µi(b) be dependent on bj (j 6= i) is not optimal. So
the above program can be simplified by only considering functions µi(b) that are functions of
bi only. Once the optimal qi(·) is given, so that Qi(bi) = Eb−iqi(b) is given, the optimization
with respect to µi(bi) can be decomposed into n programs as follows:
min
Z b¯
b
{U i(bi) +Qi(bi)[biµ(bi) + Co(µ(bi))]f(bi)dbi (19)
s.t.
U˙ i(bi) = −Qi(bi)µi(bi), (20)
U i(b¯) = 0. (21)
This is a dynamic control problem with U i as the state variable and µi as the control
variable. Solving this problem gives
C 0o(µ
i) = −bi − F (bi)/f(bi). (22)
Since µi is the same for all i, we can drop the superscript. From (20), we haveZ b¯
b
U i(bi)f(bi)dbi = U i(bi)F (bi)
¯¯b¯
b
−
Z b¯
b
F (bi)dU i(bi) =
Z b¯
b
[F (bi)Qi(bi)µ(bi)]dbi.
Therefore, the cost function in (19) can be written asZ b¯
b
Qi(bi)
·
F (bi)
f(bi)
µ(bi) + biµ(bi) + Co(µ(b
i))
¸
f(bi)dbi
Let Ai(bi) = F (b
i)
f(bi)
µ(bi) + biµ(bi) + Co(µ(b
i)). From (22), we have
dAi
dbi
= µ(bi)
µ
1 +
d
dbi
F (bi)
f(bi)
¶
> 0,
so Ai(bi) is increasing in bi. Hence we should give more weight to Qi(bi) when bi is small.
Since there are n symmetric suppliers, the optimal qi(·) must be qi(b) = 1 if bi < minj 6=i bj
and qi(b) = 0 otherwise. That is, in the optimal mechanism, the most eﬃcient supplier is
chosen with probability one. As a result, Qi(bi) = (1− F (bi))n−1.
We can derive the profit function U i from (20) and (21):
U i(bi) =
Z b¯
bi
[(1− F (x))n−1µ(x)]dx.
Again we can drop the superscript for U i. The transfer payment function is therefore given
by
R(bi)λ = (1− F (bi))n−1biµ(bi)+
Z b¯
bi
[(1− F (y))n−1µ(y)]dy.¤
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Proof of Theorem 6: This proof follows the proof of Theorem 4. See Zhang (2004) for
details.
Proof of Theorem 7: This proof follows the proof of Theorem 4. See Zhang (2004) for
details.
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